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I.

JUDGES AND POLITICS ARE SEPARATE – RIGHT?
JUDICIARY UNDER ATTACK BY POLITICS

James R. Adams is a resident and member of the State Bar of
Delaware who, for some time, has had a desire to become a state
judge.1 When several vacancies arose, Adams contemplated
applying, but after an announcement was made requiring the
candidate to be a Republican, Adams ultimately decided against
applying.2 Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat, and

1. See Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 2018)
(explaining that judges are not policymakers because decisions they make
relate to a case, not partisan political interest; and stating that applying for a
judicial vacancy requiring association with a given party violates First
Amendment rights).
2. Id.
655
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thought any application he sent would be futile.3 Adams brought
suit against the Governor of Delaware to challenge the provision of
the Delaware Constitution that effectively limits service on state
courts to members of just the Republican and Democratic parties.4
The provision in the Delaware Constitution at the time was written
as:
“Appointments to the office of the State Judiciary shall… be subject
to all of the following limitations: First, three of the five Justices of
the Supreme Court in office at the same time, shall be of one major
political party, and two of said Justices shall be of the other major
political party.”5

The Governor of Delaware’s argument was that judges are
policymakers, and therefore there should be no Constitutional
restraints on his hiring decisions.6 However, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit disagreed, informing the Governor that judges
are not policymakers, and struck down the aforementioned portion
of the Delaware Constitution as violating Adams’s First
Amendment rights.7 The court also ignored Delaware’s interest of
having political balance, as excluding independents and third
parties from the ballot was not narrowly tailored to that interest.8
The court ruled in favor of Adams and against political
entanglement on the judiciary.9 While considered a victory for
believers in strict judicial independence, should political
entanglement be completely ignored? Despite the polarized political
times, a balance must be found.
The United States of America has seen a rapid divide in
partisan politics over the last few years, most notably seen during
the 2016 Presidential Election.10 There has been a noticeable divide
along party lines, by political attitudes, social values, basic
demography, and even beliefs about reality.11 The aftermath of the
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (stating the limitations on the state judiciary,
including requiring that there be 5 justices on the Supreme Court, with three
justices belonging to one of the major political parties, and the other two justices
belonging to the other party).
6. Governor of Del., 922 F.3rd at 169.
7. Id.
8. See id. (applying the strict scrutiny standard). The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit came to the conclusion that Delaware’s state interest of
political balance is irrelevant because the practice of excluding Independents
and other third-party voters from judicial employment is not narrowly tailored
to that interest.
9. Id.
10. See Gary C. Jacobson, Polarization, Gridlock, and Presidential
Campaign Politics in 2016, 667 AAPSS 226 (2016) (explaining the political
divide amongst political parties and demographics following the 2016
Presidential Election).
11. See id. (explaining where exactly the polarized division of politics has
been felt the most).
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2016 election had the potential to shake up electoral patterns that
have prevailed during the last century, undoubtedly causing
uncertain and unpredictable consequences for national politics.12
With polarization having an additional component of viewing the
other party negatively, severe evaluation of state judicial election
process must be considered due to the issues that arise with political
polarization.13 The portions of the Delaware Constitution requiring
candidates to be affiliated with a political party is further proof that
politics have encroached on the judiciary. Reform amongst all states
must occur in order to preserve judicial independence, which sets
the judiciary apart from other branches.14
As Alexander Hamilton once said, “there is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers.”15 This Comment will opine that politics were never meant
to play a role in the judiciary. In today’s political climate, this
Comment argues why a balance is needed to accommodate the
times.
The Section II of this Comment will address the background
and origin of how states have enacted their own judicial election
process.16 Also mentioned will be the various methods used by
different states in contemplation of what would succeed in a
polarized political climate. This Comment will then provide an
analysis of the issue the United States currently faces, which is how
politics have drastically become polarized and how the rift between
both political ideologies has grown exponentially.17 This part will
also encompass an analysis of the positive and negative aspects of
political involvement in the judiciary.18 Section III of this Comment
will then provide an argument for why politics should not be

12. Id. at 226.
13. Id.
14. See The Constitution Restoration Act, Judicial Independence, and
Popular Constitutionalism, 56 CASE W. RES. 1083, 1084 (2006) (attempting to
understand what judicial independence is and how politics plays a significant
role).
15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (concerning primarily
the role and main function of the Judiciary Branch and discussing the power of
judicial review).
16. See, e.g., The Debate Over Judicial Elections and State Court Judicial
Selection, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1347 (2008) [hereinafter The Debate Over
Judicial Elections] (examining a panel of federal judges, including Supreme
Court Justice Steven Breyer, discussing the relevant issues of the election of
state judges and how judge impartiality, which is crucial to a rule of law and to
independent judiciary, is under threat).
17. Rebecca Nelson, The War on Partisanship, ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2015),
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/the-war-on-partisanship/451461/
[perma.cc/4ANE-M674] (studying the partisan divide and animosity that
exists for the opposing party).
18. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (deeming a statute
unconstitutional for prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their
political views during a campaign).
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completely removed from the judiciary. Section IV will then address
whether states should be mandated to reform the judicial election
process due to polarized political times and future uncertainty.19
Finally, this Comment will propose a resolution to the conflicts
observed throughout the Comment.

II. THE JUDICIAL ELECTION SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE
STATES
A. State Judicial Election History
A discussion of the history of state judicial elections is needed
in order to understand why the current state judicial processes are
in place today. Initially, the thirteen original states all chose their
judges either through legislative election or gubernatorial
appointment.20 However, halfway through the 19th century “the
public had lost confidence in either of the political branches to
choose qualified and impartial judges.”21 This was due to the other
state government branches lack of consensus on how to determine
who is a competent judge.22 In response, most states started to
conduct the election of judges through popular vote, and every new
state that joined the union between 1846 and 1912 provided that
their judges be selected through popular vote.23 As political parties
began to gain rising influence at the turn of the 20th century, their
political influence carried over to the judiciary, which in turn caused
widespread public dissatisfaction with the popular vote method as
well.24 It was not until the mid-20th century that most states
adopted one of two major reforms: nonpartisan ballots and the merit
selection system.25

B. The Existing Methods
1. Nonpartisan ballots
Nonpartisan ballots were first enacted during the Progressive
Era (1890-1920) in response to the widely held belief that political
19. Stan Greenberg & Linda A. DiVall, Courts Under Pressure – A Wake-up
Call From State Judges, 41 JUDGES’ J. 11 (2002) (observing the concerns of state
judges in future state judicial elections).
20. The Debate Over Judicial Elections, supra note 16, at 1353.
21. See id. (briefing the history of how the first thirteen states of the U.S.
elected their state judges).
22. Id. at 1354
23. Id. (tracking the changes of the state judicial election process as the
country was entering the Progressive Era).
24. Id. (examining the beginnings of how politics began encroaching into the
judiciary and the unrest it created with people).
25. Id.
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party bosses and organizational machines were corrupting city
governments.26 In nonpartisan elections, candidates are typically
nominated to the general election ballot by petition or by
performance in a single primary election in which they run without
party affiliation.27 Any declaration of candidacy, petitions and other
nomination papers for nonpartisan office have no mention of
political party.28
In California, an absolute nonpartisan law was instituted
because the legislature perceived that partial nonpartisan elections
fail to fully achieve its goal of differentiating judiciary elections
from other elections.29 The reasoning was that political party
activity can transform nonpartisan elections into contests
resembling partisan elections in a variety of ways.30 Without the
absolute nonpartisan law, California believed that candidates for
nonpartisan elections would still seek political endorsement and
support as if they had official party status.31
a. Advantages
Nonpartisan elections are seen as a more efficient way of
limiting political party participation in local elections.32
Nonpartisan elections serve several purposes that differ from the
various other methods of electing judges.33 These purposes include:
improving the quality of the bench, removing the strains of partisan
politics, providing a better basis for citizens to vote than the
partisan affiliations of the candidates, and lessening the impact of
moneyed players and other organized interests in judicial
elections.34
b. Disadvantages
While nonpartisan elections are generally favored and liked,
26. Nancy Northup, Local Nonpartisan Elections, Political Parties and the
First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1987) (arguing that refraining
from political interest of nonpartisan state judicial elections has greater
constitutional gratification than other known methods, despite the fact it
borderline violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution).
27. Id. at 1683; see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-37 (2021) (explaining
the nonpartisan state judicial selection voting process applied in North Dakota).
28. Northup, supra note 26, at 1683.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1684.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Melinda Gann Hall, Partisanship, Interest Groups, and Attack
Advertising in the Post-White Era, or Why Nonpartisan Judicial Elections
Really Do Stink, 31 J. L. & POLITICS 429, 432 (2016) (explaining the ideology
behind judicial nonpartisan voting, but arguing how these elections should be
abandoned for other preferred election methods).
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they are not without their flaws, and have several disadvantages
compared to the other methods.35 Similar to partisan elections, most
voters in nonpartisan elections know little about the viable
candidates.36 However, voters could be deterred from voting for an
individual without a political affiliation.37 For example, a
significant decrease in votes occurred when North Carolina
switched to nonpartisan elections.38 Nonpartisan voting has good
intent for state judiciaries; however, its flaws are noticeable and
whether they can withstand a polarized political era is in doubt.39
A trend that began in 2000, nonpartisan elections were under
attack in several states.40 In Idaho, a candidate for the Supreme
Court drew party support that was contrary to normal practice
since Idaho went nonpartisan in 1932.41 In Kansas, reform groups
in two judicial district had to spend $97,841 to defeat ballot
propositions aimed to return to partisan elections.42 A reason for
these departures is because they do not insulate judges from
political controversy as originally anticipated.43
2. Merit selection system
Another method of the judicial election process is through
merit selection system, which is designed to ensure that judges
would be selected on the basis of professional merit.44 Professional
merit includes professional qualifications, experience, legal

35. See id. at 434 (explaining how contrary to popular theories of belief,
nonpartisan elections can work in several ways that contradict the claims of the
judicial reform movement).
36. Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure- Its
Historical
Development,
7
DUQ.
L.
REV.
61
(1968)
dsc.duq.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1432&context=dlr
[perma.cc/VD68M9PE].
37. Judge Robert H. Hunter, Jr., Do Nonpartisan, Publicly Financed
Judicial Elections Enhance Relative Judicial Independence?, 93 N.C.L. REV.
1825, 1879 (2015).
38. Id.
39. Hall, supra note 34 (explaining the ideology behind judicial nonpartisan
voting, but arguing how these elections should be abandoned for other preferred
election methods).
40. Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan
Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1415 (2003) (arguing the need
to protect nonpartisan elections as the trend of the states is seemingly moving
away from that method).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Brandice Canes-Wrone and Tom S. Clarke, Judicial Independence And
Nonpartisan Elections, 1 WIS. L. REV. 21, 24 (2009).
44. Rachel Paine Caufield, What Makes Merit Selection Different?, 15 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 765, 766 (2013) (analyzing the merit selection system with
an overview of its origin, while providing an argument for both sides on whether
it should be preferred).
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expertise, impartiality, and temperament.45 Reformers tend to
praise merit selection and similar appointive systems because these
systems allegedly void problems with loss of public confidence and
trust that arise in competitive judicial elections.46
Under a typical merit selection system, a judicial nominating
commission interviews, screens, and selects potential state court
judges.47 The nominating commission then recommends a list of
candidates to the governor, who then selects an individual for the
bench.48 Typically, the appointed judge later appears before voters
in a “retention election” where the voters can vote to either keep
them or have them replaced by an unknown individual.49 The
incoming bench member is later chosen by the nominating
commission.50
a. Advantages
Proponents of merit selection argue that the system favors the
idea of removing politics from the selection of judges.51 Merit
selection proponents also contend that nominating a commissionbased system reduces the influence of money and financial means
in political campaigns for judgeships.52 Merit selection also can be
argued to produce better quality judges, as a nominating
commission thoroughly gives more time and attention to the
professional qualifications of a potential judge than voters.53 In
turn, it creates more public trust in the judiciary, as the judges are
presumed to be impartial due to being selected by an “expert”
nominating board rather than through voters.54

45. Id.
46. Id.; Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or
the Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1234-35 (2000) (analyzing why the
judicial election process is resilient to change, what other methods would work
better, and what it will take to persuade various decision makers that other
alternatives are preferable and feasible).
47. Matthew Schneider, Options For An Independent Judiciary In Michigan:
Why Merit Selection Of State Court Judges Lacks Merit, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 609,
623 (2010).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 625; see Mark I. Harrison et al., On the Validity and Vitality of
Arizona's Judicial Merit Selection System: Past, Present, and Future, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 256 (2007) (supporting further the idea of a successful
merit selection system).
52. Schneider, supra note 47 at 626.
53. Id.; see Senate Judiciary Comm. Pub. Hearing on Merit Selection: Senate
Bills 1324 and 1325, 2007-08 Session (Pa. 2008).
54. Id.
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b. Disadvantages
The merit selection system, despite what its proponents
positively suggest, has its fair share of critiques as well.55 It has
been argued that the merit selection system moves politics from out
in the open to behind closed doors.56 In fact, “[a]bout one third of
lawyer and non-lawyer commissioners have had high levels of
political or civic activity, having served in partisan or public
offices.”57 Judicial nomination commissions have tended to be white
males and dominated by lawyers and business interests.58
Furthermore, the criteria for what makes a “quality judge” is
difficult for anyone to determine.59 Judges are asked to perform
many tasks, and the job cannot merely be reduced to several
characteristics or qualities of an individual.60
Another potential for conflict is to the extent appointed judges
are influenced by political considerations when they make the
decision to run in retention elections and attempt to retain their
office.61 State judges are not free from political isolation, and based
on data, merit judges do not behave differently than elected ones,
as both exhibit the behavior of elected officials who are mindful of
public attitudes as they make decisions.62 The study, conducted by
Professor Melissa Gannon, researched 245 state supreme court
justices in thirty-eight states between 1988 and 1995, showing that
it is electoral consideration that influences judges selected by merit
selection to voluntarily retire from the bench.63 Examples of
electoral consideration include factors such as percentage of the
vote received in the previous election, whether a fellow incumbent
judge was defeated in the prior election, and the change in the
state’s ideological climate from the time of the judges initial
appointment to the time of the upcoming election. 64 From this
evidence, Professor Gannon asserts that retention election
promotes accountability since justices appear to be mindful of risk

55. Id.
56. Maute, supra note 46, at 1235.
57. Id. at 1235.
58. Id.
59. Caufield, supra note 44, at 779.
60. Id.
61. Richard B. Saphire and Paul Moke, The Ideologies of Judicial Selection:
Empiricism and the Transformation of The Judicial Selection Debate, 39 U.
TOL. L. REV. 551, 553 (2008) (challenging the assertions of the benefits of merit
selection systems with empirical data and statistics).
62. Id. at 570.
63. Id.; Melinda Gann Hall, Voluntary Retirements from State Supreme
Courts: Assessing Democratic Pressures to Relinquish the Bench, 63 J. POL. 1112
(2001) (analyzing the political pressures that influence state supreme court
justices to voluntarily retire from the bench).
64. Saphire and Moke, supra note 61, at 570; Hall, supra note 63, at 112526.
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of defeat at election polls.65
3. Partisan elections
Partisan elections offer the best opportunity for the public to
select judges according to their preferred values because they can
vote for their party of choice.66 In this type of election, party
affiliation “is an important proxy for determining whether a judge’s
decisions are likely to reflect the preferences of the voter” and in
turn more effectively allow the public to influence their state’s
judiciary.67 Party affiliation can provide one of the most valuable
determinatives on how a future judge is most likely to decide a
case.68 Other studies have found that removing political affiliation
from judicial candidates has “suppress[ed] voting, produces
idiosyncratic outcomes, and raises the cost of seeking office.”69
Voters want information to base their vote on, and arguably one of
the most important pieces of discovering a judge’s judicial
philosophy is a judge’s political affiliation.70 The main argument of
proponents is that exposing politics to the public produces better
quality results than hiding the politics in back room appointments,
where decisions are made by an elite few.71
a. Advantages
Furthermore, supporters argue that partisan elections most
effectively serve to provide accountability.72 “Partisan elections are
much more likely to assure the existence of opposition, vigorous
criticism of those in power and effective presentation of alternative
policies.”73 The campaign resources necessary to promote these
candidates are available through party organizations.74 Proponents

65. Saphire and Moke, supra note 61, at 570.
66. Id.
67. Id.; Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial "Merit"
Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 805 (2004).
68. Dimino, supra note 67 at 805.
69. Kelly Shackelford and Justin Butterfield, Symposium: Judicial
Selection: Part II. Questioning Reform: The Light of Accountability: Why
Partisan Elections Are the Best Method of Judicial Selection, 53 THE ADVOCATE
73, 75 (2010) (advocating the position of partisan elections over other judicial
election processes) (quoting Melinda Gann Hall, On the Cataclysm of Judicial
Elections
and
Other
Popular
Anti-Democratic
Myths, 12
(2009)
ssrn.com/abstract=1394525 [perma.cc/Y7XR-G9UB].
70. Shackelford and Butterfield, supra note 69 at 75.
71. Id.
72. Kurt E. Scheuerman, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L. REV. 459,
460 (1993) (analyzing the different methods of judicial elections and which best
serves judicial accountability).
73. Id. (quoting David Adamany & Philip Dubois, Electing State Judges,
1976 WIS. L. REV. 731, 774 (1976)).
74. Schuerman, supra note 72, at 460.
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believe partisan elections maximize judicial accountability because
party labels provide voters with cues as to a candidate’s basic
philosophy.75
b. Disadvantages
While partisan elections have their benefits, they do expose the
judicial candidate’s ideology to the public.76 This had led to a series
of problematic issues, such as campaign funds, which has been a
topic for debate within the United States Supreme Court.77 In a
landmark case, the Supreme Court acknowledged this particular
concern. The Court decided a landmark case that gave
constitutional recognition to an urgent concern of American
democracy.78 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court found
that the Due Process Clause required recusal from a case where a
judge had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary
amount from a board chairman who appeared in suit in front of the
judge.79 The chairman’s $3 million dollar donation exceeded the
total amount spent by all other donors, and was even more than the
judge’s candidacy committee.80 As addressed in a prior case, the Due
Process Clause included the common-law rule requiring recusal
when a judge has “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest” in a case.81 The clause also requires recusal where “the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker
is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”82 All in all, the Supreme
Court is not amused when a substantial amount of money is
intertwined with the judiciary selection process.83
The Caperton case is not the only time there has been
problematic financial issues with judicial campaigns – in fact, based
on a seven-year span, it suggests it happens quite frequently.84
“Between 2000 and 2007, over $168 million was contributed to state
supreme court campaigns, more than twice the amount contributed
75. See id. ("The availability of the party label both prompts voters to
exercise a choice, thereby increasing the percentage of the eligible electorate
participating in the election, and results in the expression in the aggregate of
the voters' preferences for the direction of judicial policy").
76. Id.
77. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice:
An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86
N.Y.U.L. REV. 69, 71 (2011) (analyzing the impact of involving partisanship
with the judicial selection process, specifically looking at political campaigns
and the effect it has had on the judiciary).
78. Id. at 70; Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
79. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 880.
80. Id. at 884.
81. Id. at 876 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
82. Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 at 876 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
47, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975)).
83. Caperton, 556 U.S. 868.
84. Kang and Shepherd, supra note 77, at 71.
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throughout the 1990s.”85 Without such substantial funding, it is
severely more difficult to win an election.86
Opponents also argue that voters are uninformed and
incompetent to make sophisticated selection of judges compared to
a selection committee.87 Furthermore, votes are simply based on
political criteria rather than merit.88 As a result, it becomes more of
a political campaign than an election based solely on judicial
qualifications.89 Another critique of partisan elections is that it
discourages qualified individuals from seeking a judicial office
position due to the fact they cannot raise enough campaign funds
compared to other candidates.90 The common fear shared by
opponents is that through judicial voting elections, the dignity and
prestige of the position is damaged.91

C. Why an Argument for Change is Needed
States are divided among these three different principal
systems for selecting state judges.92 Each state has undergone
developments in what process they use, and “[t]hese principles
consider components of the rule of law such as judicial impartiality,
independence, competence, and accountability.”93 Each method is
unique in its own way, but with politics more divisive than ever, the
question turns to which judicial process is needed during times
when the split between beliefs is polarized at new heights.94
Ultimately, the question further narrows: Should politics be left out
completely during a time when the divide is at its largest?

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Modern Political Climate
It is important to conduct an analysis on the current political
climate in order to understand the type of proposed reform needed
for the judiciary. An argument will also be made as to whether there
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Scheuerman, supra note 72, at 460-461.
88. Id. at 461.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Kang and Shepherd, supra note 77, at 79.
93. Norman L. Greene, Perspectives From The Rule Of Law And
International Economic Development: Are There Lessons For The Reform Of
Judicial Selection In The United States?, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 53, 54 (2008);
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND
DEVELOPMENT 61-63 (2008).
94. Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, And the States, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2015).

666

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:379

should be a mixture of politics with the judiciary, or if they should
remain separate. The popular perception is that through judicial
independence, the institution of the judiciary can be seen as “fair,
impartial and efficient.”95 This section will analyze how polarized
politics has impacted each branch of government and whether or
not a reform of the judiciary should include maintaining judicial
independence.
1.

Public Opinion of the Executive Branch

Following the shocking 2016 presidential election, the amount
of controversy created a forever lasting and profound impact on
public opinion.96 “[T]he CIA and FBI concluded [after the election]
that the Russian Government hacked and leaked Democratic Party
emails in an effort to help Donald Trump win the election.”97 A
majority of American citizens now question the integrity of the
nation’s election system.98 In furtherance of this never before seen
drama, “Trump himself fueled further controversy during the
campaign when he alleged that the Democrats had rigged the
election against him and predicted that massive voter fraud would
occur on Election Day.”99
Studies have identified that divisions between “Republican
and Democratic voters on a range of political issues have risen
sharply in recent years,” notably after President Trump’s first year
in office.100 These political issues range from race issues,
immigration policies, and national security.101 Since President
Barack Obama presidency and up till President Trump’s first year,
these issues have contrasted to record levels.102 Clearly the
individual in office has influenced the divide in some form for a

95. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1098
(1985) (quoting Hastings v. Judicial Conference of United States, 593 F. Supp.
1371 (1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 770 F.2d 1093) (1985)).
96. Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News,
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST.
LAW & PUB. POL'Y 57, 58 (2017).
97. Id. at 57.
98. Id.; Giovanni Russonello, Voters Fear Their Ballot Won't Count, Poll
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/politics/
voter-fraud-poll.html [perma.cc/8WKB-UGGK] (examining the thought process
of many Americans during the presidential election of 2016, who believed their
vote would not be valuable with corporate interest, as well faith in the voting
system).
99. Gaughan, supra note 96, at 57.
100. See Clare Foran, America's Political Divide Intensified During Trump's
First Year as President, ATLANTIC (Oct. 5, 2017), www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2017/10/trump-partisan-divide-republicans-democrats/541917/
[perma.cc/RL65-PFQ8] (describing the political divide that grew immensely
following the Presidential Election of 2016).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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variety of different reasons.103 In 2011, about twice as many
Democrats as Republicans said the government should do more for
the needy (54% vs. 25%).104 In 2017, nearly three times as many
Democrats than Republicans believe this same proposition (71% vs.
24%).105 Another noticeable gap in public opinion between the
parties according to the same study following the election has been
thoughts on racial discrimination.106 The gap about racial
discrimination and black advancement between the two parties has
increased about fifty points from each other – evidently, the political
divide here has immensely grown.107 Overall, since the studies on
partisan gaps began in 1994, the average partisan gap has
increased from fifteen percentage points to thirty-six points.108
These statistics also make clear that these divides are more
split on partisan ideologies rather than any difference by religious
affiliation or racial identities.109 While presidential elections
customarily include issues of political debates, the divide has grown
substantially and has forever affected how the executive position is
filled.110 The political climate has intensified, and examining the
divides occurring within the executive branch should give reason to
consider evaluating the judicial branch, and whether it needs to
reform to include politics or exclude it completely.
2. Public Opinion of the Legislative Branch
In this political era, “state legislative elections are dominated
by national politics.”111 According to some studies, “legislators
affiliated with a president’s party – especially during unpopular
presidencies – are more likely to face major party challengers”.112
Depending on presidential acceptance by the public, it can have at

103. Id.
104. The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 5, 2017), www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisandivide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/
[perma.cc/CTD2-89AT]
(examining widening differences in political ideologies by Republicans and
Democrats influenced particularly by political views, rather than divisions on
race, gender, or religious observance).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (evaluating ten PEW Research Center studies conducted since 1994
and how the partisan ideology gap amongst several different areas have
substantially grown further apart over the last few decades).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Steven Rogers, National Forces in State Legislative Elections, 667
ANNALS AAPSS 207, 209 (Sept. 2016) (studying the ramifications of state
legislative elections depending on the result of a presidential election, as well
as the main determination of whether a legislator is voted into office being tied
with partisan politics of the current president).
112. Id.
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least three times the impact on a voters’ decision during legislative
elections as compared to when an individual makes a decision based
on their own opinions of that legislator.113 The current strategy for
a legislative candidate running for a position is taking advantage of
the national political conditions.114
Another political practice that still occurs today is the act of
political gerrymandering.115 Gerrymandering has been prevalent
throughout the history of the United States and has recently
become a “critical issue in American political life.”116 The concept of
political gerrymandering is that legislators may constitutionally
draw the borders of electoral districts for the purpose of receiving
an incumbency advantage and securing the spot on the legislation,
or to simply retain their party and maintain a political
advantage.117 While negatively viewed as detestable amongst the
public, it is legal.118 The Supreme Court has ruled on the legality of
gerrymandering many times throughout the recent course of
history.119
Time and time again, redistricting, the process of redrawing
legislative districts, has created a continuous system for providing
security for an overwhelming number of congressional
incumbents.120 It has ensured candidates reelection and has stifled
voters from the opposing party.121 Furthermore, the polarized
districts in which gerrymandering creates also produce ideological
districts in which legislative members cater only to the partisan
members of their base.122 The ramifications of gerrymandering have

113. Id.
114. Id. at 212.
115. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995) (examining more modern examples of political
gerrymandering and how in most instances it is not justiciable, thus making it
available for state legislators to enact in order, with the only bar being certain
restrictions).
116. Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and
Political Gerrymandering and The Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1521
(1994); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. Michael Parsons, Clearing the Political Thicket: Why Political
Gerrymandering for Partisan Advantage is Unconstitutional, 24 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 1107, 1107 (2016).
118. Id. at 1108.
119. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (examining where
legislators created voting districts based solely on partisan political advantage,
it was deemed a non-justiciable political question); see Redistricting and the
Supreme Court: The Most Significant Cases, NCSL (Apr. 25, 2019),
www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-and-the-supreme-court-themost-significant-cases.aspx [perma.cc/J5HA-Z7BZ] (discussing recent cases
involving gerrymandering).
120. Matthew M. Weiss, Where Do We Draw The Line?: The Justiciability Of
Political Gerrymandering Claims In Light Of League Of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry, 41 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1055 (2007).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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tremendous impact on the legislative branch, with control of state
legislatures and even the United States Congress dictated by
whichever party can win a majority of seats.123 While politics in the
legislative branch is nothing new, the modern climate of politics has
significantly affected the process of who is elected, as well as how
easy it is to retain that seat.
3. Politics in the Judiciary
Based on the last two sections, it is clear how modern politics
have significantly influenced the executive and legislative branches
of government. There is thus merit to the idea that judicial
independence should hold steady and that the judiciary should be
separate from politics. The grasp of modern politics has already
influenced the judiciary in the state level in several ways, with
rising costs of judicial campaigns at the top of the list.124 High
campaign costs and contributions lead to inevitable questions of
“the integrity and impartiality of an elected judiciary.”125
In 2009, Mark Thomsen, an attorney from the Milwaukee area,
donated $5,000 to a chief justice’s judicial campaign and later sent
another donation of $500 to the campaign just days before the chief
justice ruled on a key issue of a case Thomsen was involved in.126
The court found in favor of Thomsen, with Abrahamson included in
the majority.127 The statistics show that Wisconsin judges tend to
side with the attorney that has financially assisted them with their
campaign.128
In resistance, states have proposed legislation that would allow
the judiciary to retain its function of judicial independence.129 These
types of statutes prohibit judges or judicial candidates from
participating in political speeches and advocating for an individual
from a particular political party.130 In retaliating against high
judicial campaign costs and elevated monetary donations, the
Supreme Court has upheld state statutes prohibiting an individual

123. Id.
124. See Robert J. Brink, Electing Judges Can be a Real Gamble, MASS.
LAWYER WEEKLY (Oct. 18, 2004) (analyzing the negative effects the election of
judges has on the judicial system, and how politics exacerbates the process and
impedes on the definition of judicial independence).
125. James J. Alfini & Terrence J. Brooks, Perspectives on the Selection of
Federal Judges: Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election Campaigns: A Review
and Critique of Canon 7, 77 KY. L.J. 671, 671 (1989).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Miss. CJC. Canon 5 (2002); Mich. Code Judicial Conduct 7 (2019).
130. Mich. Code Judicial Conduct 7 (2019); see e.g., Republican Party v.
Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875, 876-77 (D. Minn. 1998) (interpreting the statute that
incorporates the limitations upon the judiciary in regards to political
involvement).
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from personally soliciting campaign funds from potential
donators.131 In Florida, the prohibition of receiving funds from
political campaigns was contested, and the argument relied on the
premise that it violated the freedom of association and speech under
the First Amendment.132 While it did fall within the reach of the
First Amendment, the state of Florida relied on the strict scrutiny
standard, as it had a compelling state interest of protecting the
judiciary and keeping it impartial, and the statute was necessary to
achieve that purpose.133 Despite this pushback, this new era of
judicial campaigning has seen new questionable tactics with fund
usage, such as television advertising.134 In Ohio, television ads
accounted for more than half of candidate expenditures in the Ohio
Supreme Court.135
The reach of modern politics does indeed have a substantial
impact on the judiciary, and based on how it has negatively affected
the other two branches of government, it could lead one to believe it
will continue to get worse.136 An argument now must be made
whether politics should be allowed in the judiciary due to the
modern political climate, and if so, what kind of reform should be
made.

B. The Argument for Politics in the Judiciary
1. Those Without a Voice
While politics has its negative influences on the judiciary
election process, it has also been beneficial to many judicial
candidates.137 The idea of having politics involved is not to
deteriorate the concept of judicial independence; rather, it is to
provide an opportunity for an individual who wants to reach the
highest position in the legal profession.138 For women judges,
politics can play a crucial role in earning their honorable position.139

131. Fla. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7 (2018); see e.g., Williams-Yulee
v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) (reviewing Florida’s Code of Judicial
Conduct and the prohibition of judicial candidates from personally soliciting
from personal funds did not violate the First Amendment because the Canon
was narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest in protecting the
integrity of the judiciary).
132. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1658.
133. Id. at 1664.
134. Michael S. Kang & Joanna Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of
Judicial Campaign Finance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1248 (2013).
135. Id.
136. Martin J. Siegel, In Defense of Judicial Elections (Sort of), 36 LITIG. 23
(2010).
137. See id. (arguing for the use of judicial elections, which have politics
incorporated within the system).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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As Honorable Rhonda Lee Daniele of the Montgomery County Court
said: “The key to becoming a judge at the state level is politics,
politics, politics.”140 Judge Daniele continued to say that nice and
competent lawyers are “a dime a dozen,” implying that being a
competent lawyer is not enough to become a judge.141 Pennsylvania
Superior Court Judge Phyllis Beck has urged women to be more
proactive politically, and that “you have a product and that product
is you . . . You have to sell that product to the electorate.”142 In
reaching out and making their names known, women have an
avenue of getting recognition they unfortunately may not have
received in a legal profession that often opposes female
professionals.143 While politics, as discussed above, seems to go
against the concept of judicial independence, it can be argued it has
provided an avenue for women to gain honorable roles in the
judiciary.
Whether elected or appointed, politics has played an important
role for many judges in gaining judicial office.144 For example,
Justice Rosalyn Richter of the Supreme Court of Manhattan in New
York, who is disabled and openly gay, described how making friends
and connections politically with big time lawyers assisted her in
gaining her judicial office.145 Politics plays a major factor in
becoming a judge, especially for minority candidates, whose
addition to the judiciary is necessary for diversity and
impartiality.146
Minorities care more about race relations than whites.147
Racial minorities continue to suffer discrimination.148 These are
prevalent issues, and if politics can help judicial candidates who
otherwise would not have the opportunity to gain judicial office and
offer representation to the judiciary in hopes to alleviate these
issues, politics cannot be separated.
2. A Constitutional Right
One compelling reason why politics should not be removed
despite the polarized political times is because it would be in

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Siegel, supra note 136.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Diversity, Impartiality, and Representation
on the Bench: Does A Diverse Judiciary Attain A Rule of Law That is Inclusive?:
What Grutter V. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 10 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 101, 102-103 (2008) (indicating the significance of what a diverse and
impartial bench has on the judiciary and what impact it can have).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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violation of the First Amendment.149 The Supreme Court ruled
along these lines in its opinion in Republican Party v. White, when
an attorney who, while running for the Minnesota Supreme Court,
distributed campaign literature which criticized several of the
court’s opinion on matters such as crime and welfare.150 The
attorney did this in violation of a canon of judicial conduct that
prohibited judicial candidates from announcing their political
views.151 The court found this canon to be in violation of the First
Amendment because the state did not narrowly tailor it to serve a
compelling state interest.152 The First Amendment issue was raised
because of the abridgement of the right to speak out on disputed
issues.153 In most scenarios, legislation made to prohibit any kind of
speech would have to pass the muster of the court’s strict scrutiny
test, and the government will most likely have a difficult time in
overcoming this scrutiny test.154 While politics seems like an
“attack” on the judiciary, particularly on judicial independence,155 a
limitation on freedom of speech will always invoke a possible
violation of the First Amendment.156
It can be argued that politics should be restricted from the
judiciary if the state has a compelling interest in upholding a
statute that is narrowly tailored to that interest.157 Arizona met
that standard in Wolfson v. Concannon, when it had a compelling
interest in protecting the public’s perception of the “judge’s honesty,
impartiality, temperament and fitness.”158 The court recognized
this as a vital state interest, and it was compelling for the state to
protect the integrity of the state’s sitting judges.159 The court also
149. See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 768, 788 (2002) (providing that
the canon of judicial conduct prohibiting candidates in jury selection from
announcing their views violates the First Amendment).
150. Id. at 768-769.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 775.
153. Id. at 781.
154. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe:
Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians., 21 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 303-304 (2003) (arguing that is impossible for the
government to make an exception to limit and restrict the political speech of
judges and judicial candidates following the decision in Republican Party v.
White).
155. See The Honorable Penny J. White, Preserving the Legacy: A Tribute to
Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, One Who Exalted Judicial Independence, 38 U.
RICH. L. REV. 615, 615-616 (2004) (arguing that without judicial independence,
the United States would be without equal opportunity, respect for constitutional
freedoms, and equal justice under the law).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
157. See Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that
restrictions on judicial candidate speech under an Arizona Code of Judicial
Conduct survived First Amendment strict scrutiny, as the state had a
compelling interest in upholding public confidence in the judiciary).
158. Id. at 1181.
159. Id. at 1182.
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found that prohibiting personal solicitation for campaign funds was
narrowly tailored to preserving the public’s perception of an honest
state judiciary.160 While Wolfson is an example of a case overcoming
strict scrutiny, it is a difficult test to pass when excluding politics is
in the interest of the state.161 Unless a state can meet the high
standard of narrowly tailoring a law to serve a compelling state
interest, politics cannot be excluded completely from the judiciary.

C. Is Reform Needed?
1. The Uncertain Future
The landscape for future judicial elections, without reform, will
remain uncertain, similar to the impact modern politics has on the
other branches of government.162 Concurrently, judicial
independence cannot be ignored despite the incorporation of politics
in the judiciary.163

IV. PROPOSAL
Politics must be incorporated into the judiciary and cannot be
excluded despite extreme political polarization and the need for
judicial independence. However, judicial independence cannot be
completely ignored, and there must be a limitation on the level of
political involvement in the state judiciary systems.164 This
Comment’s proposal seeks to find the proper systematic solution in
allowing politics in the judiciary while respecting the independence
the judiciary seeks to enjoy. The best method would be utilizing
partisan ballots along with a specific budget respective for each
state, limiting every candidate to a certain amount that they can
spend up to and cannot surpass. This Comment proposes that
politics should be involved in state judicial elections because it
enables opportunities for potential diverse candidates that
otherwise would not be able to receive proper recognition.
There is a clear problem of polarized partisan politics in today’s
160. Id.
161. E.g., Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 198-199 (6th Cir. 2010)
(establishing that statutes limiting or restricting political speech and
association is unlikely to pass the muster of the strict scrutiny test); Tashjian
v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (establishing that states have the
“power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections”); and Siefert v.
Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 982 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying strict scrutiny and held
that Wisconsin could not show a compelling interest in impeding candidates
from publicizing their legal or political views).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social Welfare, 112
MICH. L. REV. 575, 576 (2014) (stressing the importance of judicial
independence as it is the cornerstone of American constitutionalism).
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modern society. Also, the legislative and executive branches have
seen an increase in the amount of political partisan issues that have
not only divided politics, but society as well.165 The judiciary has
found itself in an awkward position where it does not know whether
politics should be incorporated into its elections or not. There is also
no exception to the First Amendment that judicial candidates must
remain politically silent. No exception should be made to silence an
individual.
With this in mind, judicial independence clearly cannot be
ignored. As Chief Justice John Marshall once said: “I have always
thought, from my earliest youth till now that the greatest scourge
an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning
people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary.”166
Judicial independence is “the preservation of liberty, individual
rights, and respect for the bench”167 The founders of this country
wanted the judicial branch to be separated from the other two
branches of government.168 The proposal of this Comment keeps
this value in mind. Implementation of this proposal would spark an
interest in maintaining both judicial independence while allowing
candidates to keep their political rights.
The full procedure of this proposal must be explained to fully
understand how both concepts of judicial independence and politics
can be converged together. First, each individual who wishes to
become a judicial candidate must submit a petition containing a
substantial number of signatures. The number of signatures should
be determined on a state-to-state basis that reflects the general
population of each respective area. These signatures can be
obtained through any legitimate means, whether it be political
conventions or other organizations. Then, the petition will be sent
to the respective state’s judicial committee where they will look over
the candidate’s credentials and determine whether they are fit for
the judiciary. Each state can enact their own standards and
procedure on how best to approve an individual’s candidacy.
However, at this point the candidate’s political affiliation is
anonymous to the committee, and the candidate must be approved
to become a candidate solely on merit. Once they pass this test, they
will be allowed to become a candidate on the state or county ballot.
When the candidate is then placed on the ballot, they are free
165. See Nate Cohn, Polarization Is Dividing American Society, Not Just
Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/upshot/pol
arization-is-dividing-american-society-not-just-politics.html [perma.cc/8T5HQFTT] (examining the divide in American society due to the polarization that
is dividing politics).
166. Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court's Thoughts? The High Price of
Judicial Elections, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 29, 29 (2008); Jefferson B. Fordham
& Theodore H. Husted, Jr., John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 57, 61 (1955).
167. Bills, supra note 166, at 34.
168. Id.
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to announce their political affiliation and it may be placed on the
ballot as well. They are also free to be endorsed by any organization
and may receive funds for campaign purposes. As mentioned,
campaign costs have become increasingly high.169 That is why this
proposal also seeks a mandatory budget on how much each
candidate can spend. These restrictions should be passed by state
legislators, and will be able to pass the strict scrutiny standard of
the court for the sole purpose of protecting the integrity of the
judicial courts and that it cannot be something that can be
purchased.170 In such a scenario, the Supreme Court has held that
the key is that the state must explain their compelling interest in
maintaining a fair, impartial judiciary while offering judicial
candidates their constitutional rights of freedom of speech and
association. 171 While some may see this as having a limiting effect
on speech, the interest it serves is keeping the judiciary impartial
and maintaining its integrity. It is a seat that must be earned, not
bought through astronomical campaign funds.
As mentioned, the limit to how much a campaign can cost is an
important issue to address.172 This should be determined by each
county and state respectively. One universal sum might not be ideal
for certain counties and states for a variety of reasons. Population
size or for what level of the judiciary one is seeking should be factors
in determining how high or low the limitation should be. It is
important for each state to be thorough when enacting legislation
to limit the cost of campaign funding and spending.
In Suster v. Marshall, a judicial conduct canon that placed a
limit on the amount of money a judicial candidate could spend in a
campaign was found to be unconstitutional because it limited the
political speech of a candidate; and the canon was not narrowly

169. See Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial
Independence and Popular Democracy, 79 DENV. U.L. REV. 65, 76-77 (2001)
(arguing for the adoption of different reform systems, unlike replacing an
election system). Such reform includes “[l]engthening judicial terms, reforming
campaign financing, [and] eliminating constraints on judicial speech.” Id.
170. E.g. In re Callaghan, 238 W. Va. 495 (2017) (examining legislation that
was able to pass the muster of court’s strict scrutiny standard); Williams-Yulee
v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (identifying an occurrence where speech
restriction withstands strict scrutiny); In re Complaint of Fadeley, 310 Or. 548
(1990) (acknowledging that political speech is subject to the First Amendment);
and Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016) (examining legislation
that was able to pass the muster of court’s strict scrutiny standard, and that
the state had a compelling interest in protecting the integrity and impartiality
of the judicial system by narrowly tailoring a law to that particular
governmental interest).
171. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1985); see Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 697 (N.D.
Ohio 1996) (explaining that “a statute may constitutionally restrict campaign
finances to prevent corruption” as long as “the statute does so in a narrowly
tailored way”).
172. Id.
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tailored to match the state’s compelling interest.173
The spending cutoff point must not be so limiting that it
hinders free speech and must be narrowly tailored to the states’
compelling interest. As seen throughout this Comment, there have
been cases where the state had an interest in maintaining the
integrity of the courts.174 The position of a judge is one that must be
earned, not bought. This proposal acknowledges this principle, and
it is certainly a compelling interest for each state to have in these
polarized political times.
A proposal such as this is crucial in these political times. There
must be an even balance between both judicial independence and
politics. If it is too far politically swayed, the judiciary can have the
negative political effects that the legislative and executive branch
currently experience. This Comment has also shown the negative
effects heavy politics has on the judiciary today. It can be argued
that this proposal of allowing politics to be involved with the
judiciary should not come to fruition because of how split many are
on political ideologies.175 In fact, public trust in government is
declining at a staggering rate.176 However, the problematic disputes
of modern politics are not going away any time soon.177 The mere
fact that politics are seemingly more polarized and prominent
should not prohibit judges and judicial candidates from engaging in
politics. In actuality, now would be the greatest time to legitimately
consider the merit of this proposal. In considering it now, a perfect
balance can be created on how much politics should be allowed and
to what extent. If this proposal is not considered soon enough,
politics will consume the judiciary, and reform will be inevitable.178
The best way to combat extreme politics in the judiciary is to
173. Suster, 951 F. Supp at 702.
174. Callaghan, 238 W. Va. 495; Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656; Fadeley,
310 Or. 548; Wolfson, 811 F.3d 1176.
175. Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing
Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and
Everyday Life, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 12, 2014), www.peoplepress.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
[perma.cc/TR55-4BDJ].
176. See Trust and Distrust in America: Many Americans Think Declining
Trust in the Government and in Each other Makes it Harder to Solve Key
Problems. They Have a Wealth of Ideas About What’s Gone Wrong and How to
Fix it, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 22, 2019), www.people-press.org/2019/0
7/22/trust-and-distrust-in-america/ [perma.cc/6KVG-J8S4] (analyzing the trust
American citizens have with the federal government with statistics gathered
through various survey questions).
177. Elizabeth Ross, America's Polarized Politics May be Here to Stay, PRI
(June 3, 2019), www.pri.org/stories/2019-06-03/americas-polarized-politicsmay-be-here-stay [perma.cc/6FZQ-TUVA].
178. See Patrick Berry, Reforming State Judicial Selection: States Must
Consider how to Safeguard the Independence of State, BRENNAN CTR. (Oct. 16,
2010),
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/reforming-statejudicial-selection [perma.cc/UT5J-D6AM] (arguing that the state judicial
selection needs reform in several regards in order to limit politics).
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presently find a current balance between that and judicial
independence.
The balance is needed now more than ever. At the turn of the
century, only 3.8% of all state judges were African Americans.179
“Almost every other demographic group is underrepresented when
compared to their respective share in the nation’s population.”180
Through political means and support, this Comment has
established how politics has enabled those of minority status to gain
a place on a judicial bench. While there is political turmoil, a diverse
and unique bench can combat the rising polarization of ideologies.
The proposal finally seeks to prohibit any relinquishing of
constitutional rights of judicial candidates and judges alike.
Whether a judicial candidate or not, everyone has the same rights
to freedom of speech and association.181 An exception cannot be
made to prohibit this right to any citizen. The proposal at hand
allows for politics to assist those to get nominated for review for the
ballot, and it allows voters to see what affiliation each candidate
has. The only time where the notion of politics is removed is when
the judicial committee must choose from a list of names who must
be on the ballot. This is where merit comes above any other criteria.
This proposed system is not expected to be perfect. However, no
state judicial election system has ever been perfect. This system is
able to take the benefits of politics while also negating some of the
negative effects on each branch of the government.

V. CONCLUSION
The proposal at hand would allow an opportunity for politics to
be involved with the judiciary, while attempting to maintain its
fundamental functions. This proposal was created not to make
politics the focus, but to establish a balance before politics consumes
the judiciary like it has the other branches. It has already been
shown how politics has heavily been involved with the judiciary.
Now is the time to consider making changes that would strengthen
and invoke more trust in the judiciary. Diversity within the
judiciary branch will improve through these changes. Additionally,
there will be greater emphasis on the candidate rather than the
money spent. Money should not be the ultimate factor when
considering who should interpret the laws of this country. While it
can be argued this proposal opposes judicial independence, it
actually is an attempt to balance it with politics and to ensure the
judiciary is unharmed from the uncertain political future.
179. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality
and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 95 (1997).
180. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Improving Judicial Diversity, BRENNAN CTR.
(Mar. 3, 2010), www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/improvingjudicial-diversity [“].
181. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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